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ASBTRACT 
This study empirically investigates the “relative tax gap hypothesis,” which posits that the greater the size of 
the relative tax gap, the greater the degree to which the U.S. Treasury must borrow from domestic and/or 
other credit markets and hence the higher the ex ante real interest rate yield on the Bellwether 30 year U.S. 
Treasury bond. The study uses the most current data available for computing what is referred to here as the 
“relative tax gap,” which is the ratio of the aggregate tax gap (the loss in federal income tax revenue resulting 
from personal income tax evasion) to the GDP level. For each year of the study period, the nominal value of the 
tax gap is scaled by the nominal GDP level and expressed as a percentage. The study period runs from 1982 
through 2016, reflecting data availability for all of the variables. The estimation results provide strong support 
for the hypothesis. In addition, in separate estimations, evidence is provided that the relative tax gap also acts 
to elevate the ex ante real interest rate yield on Moody’s Baa-rated long-term corporate bonds. It logically 
follows, then, that to the extent that a greater relative tax gap leads to higher ex ante real interest rates, it may 
contribute to the crowding out of corporate investment in new plant equipment associated heretofore with 
government budget deficits per se. 
 
KEYWORDS 
aggregate personal income tax evasion; the relative tax gap; ex ante real interest rate yield on the Bellwether 
bond; Moody’s Baa-rated long-term corporate bonds; reduced investment in new plant and equipment 
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INTRODUCTION 
In any nation having a personal income tax in place, personal income tax evasion consists largely of 
taxable income that is either unreported or underreported by households to the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) or to its counterpart government tax collection authority outside the U.S. Insofar as the U.S. is 
concerned, personal income tax evasion can also consist of either spurious or inflated tax deductions or 
fabricated exemptions or other misrepresentations on various IRS tax forms. Such IRS forms might 
include Form 1040 itself or Form 1040-EZ and/or Form 1040 Schedules A, C, C-EZ, and E, among others 
(Phillips, 2014). Scholarly research inquiries into the various dimensions of income tax evasion, especially 
personal income tax evasion but to some degree corporate tax evasion as well, fall into a number of 
distinct and rather broad categories. 
One of the primary avenues of this tax evasion-related research is the essentially theoretical, largely 
mathematical models of personal income tax evasion behavior, although corporate tax evasion behavior 
is also addressed to a limited degree. Studies found in this string of the literature include works by Cebula 
(1997), Sandmo (2005), and Richardson (2006). Some of these frameworks have in fact laid the 
R. Cebula                                                                                                                                                               American Business Review 23(1) 
__________________________________________________ 
1 Short-term issues would be typified by U.S. Treasury bills, whereas longer-term issues would include Treasury notes 




groundwork for subsequent empirical research in one form or another regarding the identification of 
factors that are determinants of (exert influence upon) income tax evasion.  
Another, quite different, dimension of tax evasion studies involves endeavors that either conduct 
experiments on personal income tax evasion/compliance behavior or, in a few cases, assume the form of 
surveys and questionnaires. Included within this research grouping are a variety of works undertaken 
using an array of different contexts, such as the relatively recent studies by Yalami and Gumus (2013), 
Tarun and Jasmin (2013), Awan and Hannan (2014), Bayer and Sutter (2008), Obafemi (2014), and 
Ameyaw, et al. (2015). Such studies are largely empirical in nature, deriving their data from the 
experiments (or from the questionnaires and surveys) involved in the studies. On the one hand, certain 
of these studies indicate an aversion to the prospect of being audited while, on the other hand, a number 
of alternative studies reveal a lack of such risk-averse behavior. Still other of these scholarly papers find 
that some portion of taxpayers may be averse to tax evasion on moral or ethical grounds, whereas certain 
people are opposed to tax compliance due to secondary gains they receive from evasion. Moreover, some 
studies find evidence that taxpayers use tax evasion as a means of expressing dis-satisfaction with 
government policies and/or actions. Additionally, in several such studies, an increased incentive to evade 
personal income taxation by underreporting income is attributed to higher marginal income tax rates, a 
finding not by any means restricted  to the U.S. (Chan, Troutman, and O'Bryan, 2000; Tarun and Jasmin, 
2013; Obafemi, 2014; Awan and Hannan, 2014; and Ameyaw, et al., 2015).  
The remaining broad categories of income tax evasion studies consist of those that largely or, in some 
cases exclusively, adopt what may be referred to as "official data,” i.e., data secured from either the IRS 
and/or from some other “official,” i.e., typically a central government agency or one form or another 
of provincial government source, and/or from a recognized and acknowledged publicly available non-
governmental origin. Among the types of information thusly obtained and analyzed are data on 
income tax evasion per se, unreported income, income tax rates, IRS audit rates, IRS penalties, income 
detection technology, government deficits and/or debt, and indices expressly indicating dissatisfaction 
with government.  
This line of scholarly inquiry can be broken into at least two component parts. The first of these takes 
the form of endeavors to quantify the magnitude or impacts of the aggregate degree of federal income 
tax evasion in the macro-economy (Frey, Weck, and Pommerehne, 1982; Isachsen and Strom, 1985; 
Bajada, 1999; Giles, 1999; Fisman and Wei, 2004; Ledbetter, 2004, 2007; Cebula, 2018, 2019; Gale and 
Krupkin, 2019). The second component attempts to identify factors that influence the degree/extent of 
aggregate federal personal income tax evasion or compliance (Kirchgaessner, 1983; Hill and Kabir, 1996; 
Cebula, 1997, 2004; Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Labton, 2000; Ali, Cecil, and Knoblett, 
2001; Fisman and Wei, 2004; Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2005); Richardson, 2006; Dell’Anno, 2007; 
Engstrom and Holmlund, 2009; Cebula and Feige, 2012; Ariyo and Belcoe, 2012; Phillips, 2014; Ameyaw and 
Dzaka, 2016; Chatzimichael, Kalaitzidakis, and Tzouvelekas, 2019). Some of these studies focus upon 
individual tax returns, such as the relatively recent study by Phillips (2014), although most focus on more 
aggregative data. However, despite the substantial breadth, diversity, and depth of this tax evasion 
literature, to date no scholarly study has addressed the impact of the tax gap per se on the market for U.S. 
Treasury debt issues. 
On a somewhat related topic, over the last half century, the unified (total) federal budget has been 
in a state of deficit in all but four years (see Table 1). Largely as a consequence of this circumstance, a 
scholarly literature has been generated that focuses upon the interest rate yield effects of these 
budget deficits, especially with respect to the yields on relatively longer-term Treasury debt issues1 
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and longer-term corporate debt issues2 (Hoelscher, 1986; Zahid, 1988; Ostrosky, 1990; Swamy, Kolluri, 
and Singamsetti, 1990; Cebula and Saltz, 1998; Gissey, 1999; Vamvoukas, 2002; Mukhtar and Zaharia, 
2002; Aisen and Hauner, 2008; Kameda, 2014; Cebula, 2018). It is noteworthy that, however, none of the 
published interest rate literature has explored the potential impact of the tax gap per se on interest 
rate yields. 
 
Table 1. The Total/Unified Federal Budget Deficit as Percentage of GDP, 1968-2016 









1969 -0.3 1993 2.8 
1970 0.3 1994 2.8 
1971 2.1 1995 2.2 
1972 2.1 1996 1.3 
1973 1.1 1997 0.3 
1974 0.4 1998 -0.8 
1975 3.3 1999 -1.3 
1976 4.1 2000 -2.3 
1977 2.6 2001 -1.2 
1978 2.6 2002 1.5 
1979 1.6 2003 3.3 
1980 2.6 2004 3.4 
1981 2.5 2005 2.5 
1982 3.9 2006 1.8 
1983 5.9 2007 1.1 
1984 4.7 2008 3.1 
1985 5.0 2009 9.8 
1986 4.9 2010 8.7 
1987 3.1 2011 8.5 
1988 3.0 2012 6.8 
1989 2.7 2013 4.1 
1990 3.7 2014 2.8 
1991 4.4 2015 2.5 




Source: Council of Economic Advisors (2018, Table B-18). 
 
Accordingly, the objective of this study is to contribute to the bodies of scholarly literature on both 
interest rates and income tax evasion by empirically investigating the impact of aggregate federal 
personal income tax evasion in the form of the relative tax gap on the bellwether ex ante real interest 
rate yield on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds. In order to measure the aggregate degree of federal 
personal income tax evasion in a useful fashion, we adopt what is referred to here as the relative tax 
gap, which is defined in this study as the “tax gap,” i.e., the value of the difference between actual 
nominal Treasury tax collections and what those nominal tax collections would have been in the 
absence of income tax evasion, relative to, i.e., scaled by, the nominal GDP level. The relative tax gap, 
which is discussed in further detail in Section 2 of this study, is converted from decimal form and  
expressed as a percentage. In this study, the fundamental hypothesis under investigation is that the





larger the relative tax gap (taken here as the measure of aggregate personal federal income tax 
evasion), the higher the ex ante real interest rate yield on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds, ceteris paribus. 
The study period runs from 1982 through 2016, which reflects the availability of the expected inflation 
series available to permit the generation of the ex ante real interest rate series and the series needed 
to compute the relative tax gap.  
It is worth stressing that the relative tax gap is quite different from the AGI Gap. The latter is simply 
an estimate of the degree to which households underreport their taxable income to the IRS and other 
tax authorities (such as, within the U.S., state departments of revenue). Hence, the AGI Gap differs 
from the tax gap in that AGI Gap is not the value of lost tax revenues/collections to the U.S. Treasury 
resulting from personal tax evasion (Gale and Krupkin, 2019). Furthermore, in order to generate the 
relative tax gap, the nominal tax gap is expressed in this study, unlike other studies, as a percent of 
the nominal GDP level, whereas the AGI Gap found in other studies is expressed as the ratio of the 
aggregate unreported adjusted gross income to the estimated actual aggregate adjusted gross 
income.  
 
THE RELATIVE TAX GAP AND THE BASIC FRAMEWORK  
 
To begin the analysis, we provide a description of how the Tax Gap and Relative Tax Gap measures of 
aggregate income tax evasion are computed. The construction of the Relative Tax Gap involves, most 
fundamentally, the use of the AGI Gap, which (as noted above) is defined as the percentage of 
aggregate adjusted gross income that is either unreported or underreported on personal income tax 
returns submitted to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). For computational purpose, the AGI Gap is 
expressed as a decimal, AGIGAPDEC. The Relative Tax Gap construction also involves the aggregate 
federal personal income tax (in current dollars) actually paid by households to the IRS, AFPINCTXPD. 
Together, these data are used first to estimate the magnitude of the total (aggregate) federal personal 
income tax liability of households (in current dollars) in the absence of tax evasion, AGGFPITL: 
AGGFPITL = AFPINCTXPD/(1.00 – AGIGAPDEC).  
The difference between the amount owed to the IRS in the absence of tax evasion and the amount 
actually paid to the IRS is the nominal Tax Gap. In particular, the nominal Tax Gap, which is estimated 
aggregate nominal unpaid federal personal income liabilities, is then computed, as follows: Tax Gap 
= AGGFPITL – AFPINCTXPD. Finally, the Relative Tax Gap is the nominal Tax Gap scaled by, i.e., expressed 
as a percentage of, nominal gross domestic product, GDP, so as to permit comparisons of the Tax Gap 
over time: Relative Tax Gap = Tax Gap/GDP. This variable is the key variable of interest in this study. The 
interested reader can find the relative tax gap values for each year of the study period in Table 2. 





Table 2. Relative Tax Gap, by Year, 1982-2016 Study Period* 









1983 1.188234 2000 1.170243 
1984 1.184111 2001 1.264393 
1985 1.122022 2002 1.220207 
1986 1.168484 2003 1.159931 
1987 1.034173 2004 1.063993 
1988 0.854023 2005 1.230051 
1989 0.984020 2006 1.257119 
1990 0.923881 2007 1.106253 
1991 0.886181 2008 1.051318 
1992 0.956774 2009 0.849262 
1993 1.073845 2010 0.764936 
1994 1.117190 2011 1.023240 
1995 1.087886 2012 1.065787 
1996 1.123419 2013 1.126630 
1997 1.086484 2014 1.294455 
1998 1.227838 2015 1.287756 




* Sources: Ledbetter (2004, 2007), Foertsch (2016), Internal Revenue Service (2014), and the Council of Economic Advisors (2004; 
2018). 
 
Given this backdrop, we adopt the open-economy loanable funds model specification found in 
Madura (2008, esp., pp. 24-32), modified in order to accommodate the relative tax gap. It is within this 
context that the real interest rate yield on 30-year Treasury bonds is, assuming all other bond markets 
are in equilibrium, determined by the following condition:  
             
S + DEF/GDP = D + MB/GDP + NCI/GDP                 (1) 
 
where: S = the supply of 30-year Treasury bonds; 
DEF/GDP = the total/unified federal budget deficit, expressed as a percentage of GDP;  
D = the private sector demand for 30-year Treasury bonds;  
MB/GDP = the monetary base, expressed as a percentage of GDP; and 
NCI/GDP = net international financial capital inflows, expressed as a percent of GDP. 
Following Madura (2008, esp. pp. 24-32), Hoelscher (1986), and Cebula (2018), while also integrating the 
tax gap into the specification, it is hypothesized that: 
 
D = D (EAR30, EAR3YR, EARTF, Y), DEAR30 > 0, DEAR3YR < 0, DEARTF < 0, DY < 0                           (2) 
S = S (EAR30, TAXGAP/GDP), SEAR30 < 0, STAXGAP/GDP > 0                                                      (3) 
 
where: EAR30 = the ex ante real interest rate yield on 30-year Treasury bonds;  
EAR3YR = the ex ante real interest rate yield on three-year Treasury notes; 
EARTF = the ex ante real interest rate yield on high grade municipal bonds;   
Y = the percentage growth rate in real GDP; and 
TAXGAP/GDP = the relative tax gap, i.e., the ratio of lost nominal tax revenue to the coffers of the 
U.S. Treasury resulting from personal income tax evasion to the GDP, expressed as a percent.
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Since the specification is expressed in terms of the ex ante real interest rate yield, this study required 
a measure of expected future price inflation. Various such measures exist, including those derived from 
the adaptive expectations and rational expectations models and from other analytical frameworks, as 
well as from pure survey data (Swamy, Kolluri, and Singamsetti, 1990). Model-based measures of 
expected future inflation rates rely fundamentally on empirical estimations, within the context of which 
both economic theory and statistical methods are combined and then applied to data. The latter data 
typically include a variety of financial variables and inflation series, although other information can be 
incorporated in accordance with the specified model.  
On the other hand, survey-based measures of expected future inflation are directly obtained by 
soliciting the views of respondents regarding the future inflation outlook. There are differences across 
these surveys such as: the types/traits (such as age, educational attainment, gender, and income) of 
people who are contacted for the survey; the forecast time horizon; the variables of concern in the 
survey; and even in how the pertinent inflation expectations questions are posed. These considerations 
can influence the interpretation, validity, and usefulness of the survey responses. For example, one well-
known series on expected future inflation, The Livingston Survey, a widely-used survey gathered for 
many years by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, was found by Swamy, Kolluri, and Singamsetti 
(1990) to be fundamentally flawed in several ways in the study.  
Based on the observations above, it can be reasonably argued that it may be useful to adopt  
fundamentally model-based, as opposed to purely survey-based, data on expected future inflation. 
Interestingly, since 1982, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (2019) has reported estimates of the 
average expected future inflation rates of the CPI in the U.S. in each year for the ensuing ten years. 
These are calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland principally by using a model that 
integrates various financial market data as well as survey-based data.3 Accordingly, the present study 
adopts these calculated data as the measure of expected future price inflation, so that the ex ante real 
interest rate yields adopted in this study are expressed in the form of the percentage nominal interest 
rate minus this expected percentage future inflation rate.4 
According to this framework, the private sector demand for 30-year Treasury bonds is modeled as 
being an increasing function of EAR30 since bond buyers would logically prefer a higher real rate of return 
on their investment, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, in theory, the Treasury (as the issuer of 30-year 
Treasury bonds) would supply/issue fewer 30-year bonds to the financial marketplace in response to a 
higher EAR30, ceteris paribus, this being because a higher value for EAR30 would imply elevated debt 
service costs. 
Next, the variable EAR3YR is included in this study as a measure of the yield on a shorter-term taxable, 
high quality debt issue that would compete in the financial marketplace with 30-year Treasury bonds, 
whereas the variable EARTF is included in the specification to represent the yield on a bond issue that is 
fundamentally different from 30-year Treasuries insofar as its interest payments are exempt from federal 
income taxation while also directly competing with 30-year Treasuries by virtue of its being both longer-
term and of high quality. In any case, it is hypothesized that the higher the value of either EAR3YR or 
EARTF, the greater the degree to which investors substitute either three-year Treasury notes or high 
grade municipal bonds, respectively, for 30-year Treasury bonds in their portfolios and thereby reduce 
their demand for the 30-year Treasuries, ceteris paribus. Clearly, then, the lower the demand for 30-year 
bonds, the lower the 30-year bond price and hence the higher the 30-year bond yield. It is noteworthy 
that as an alternative to the variable EAR3YR, three other shorter term ex ante real Treasury bill interest
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rate yields were considered, namely, those on the three-month Treasury bill, the six-month Treasury bill, 
and the one-year Treasury bill. In all three cases, the variable in question introduced significant multi-
collinearity and hence each was discarded in favor of EAR3YR.5  
During times of more rapid real GDP growth, the transactions demand for money is expected to rise 
more rapidly (Madura, 2008, p. 31). The scenario would in turn be expected to lead to rising interest rates 
in the financial markets and thereby to reduce the demand for 30-year government bonds, ceteris 
paribus. This is because longer-term bonds carry a greater degree of “interest rate risk” during such 
times. In other words, the higher the growth rate of real GDP, Y, the greater the demand for equities, 
real estate, and other assets that appreciate in value rather than for 30-year bonds, which depreciate in 
value during such times. Hence, the demand for these 30-year bonds is a decreasing function of Y, ceteris 
paribus. In any case, the greater the value of Y, the lower the demand for these long-term Treasuries, 
and consequently the lower their market price will be and the higher their real interest rate yield will be. 
As Madura (2008, p. 32) observes, greater “…economic growth puts upward pressure on interest 
rates…” 
As summarized in the text above, the tax evasion measure is defined in this study as the relative tax 
gap, TAXGAP/GDP. This variable is the nominal tax gap (the difference between actual nominal Treasury 
income tax collections and what those nominal tax collections would have been in the absence of 
personal income tax evasion in the form of underreporting of taxable income) expressed as a percent 
of nominal GDP. Alternatively stated, (TAXGAP/GDP)t is the nominal tax gap in year t scaled by the 
nominal GDP in year t and then converted to a percent. Measuring the tax gap in this fashion permits 
judging the size of the tax gap relative to the size of the economy over time. As hypothesized in 
equation (3) above, in this study, the greater the extent of federal personal income tax evasion thusly 
measured, the greater the degree to which the Treasury must issue/supply new securities, including 
issues such as 30-year Treasury bonds, and, accordingly, the lower the price and hence the higher the 
real yield on those 30-year issues will be in the financial marketplace, ceteris paribus. 
The aggregate domestic supply of loanable funds, which by its nature, can be available for the 
purchase of myriad alternative financial investments (including 30-year Treasury bonds), can be reflected 
in various ways. In this study, the aggregate domestic supply of loanable funds is treated as being 
reflected in large part by the monetary base (MB), with the monetary base expressed by the ratio 
(MB/GDP), i.e., expressed as a percent of GDP. This specification permits evaluation of the monetary base 
relative to the size of the economy. Moreover, in the U.S., for the period December, 2008 through 
October, 2014, the Federal Reserve engaged in three stages of “quantitative easing:” QE1, QE2, and QE3. 
In turn, these forms of quantitative easing exercised a positive impact on the size of the monetary base; 
therefore, adopting this variable as a measure of the availability of loanable funds, as opposed to, say, 
the M2 money supply, possesses the advantage that it, in theory, measurably reflects the degree of 
quantitative easing (Cebula, 2018). In any case, the greater the magnitude of the monetary base variable, 
the greater the availability of  loanable funds in the aggregate and hence the lower the real interest rate 
(EAR30) should be, ceteris paribus (Madura, 2008, p. 34). 
Net financial capital inflows (NCI) are also included in the model. Naturally, when there is a net inflow 
of financial capital, the funds can be directed towards a wide variety of alternative investment options, 
including if not especially those offered in the financial markets. More specifically, within the latter 
context, net capital inflows may be used to purchase any of a variety of equities issues and/or bonds. 
Thus, other things held constant, the greater the volume of NCI relative to GDP that is used to purchase 
bonds in the U.S., the greater the downward pressure on interest rate yields in the economy’s financial





markets as a whole, including that for 30-year Treasury issues. Consequently, consistent with the 
conventional wisdom (Madura, 2008, pp. 35-36), it is hypothesized that the ex ante real interest rate yield 
on 30-year Treasury bonds is a decreasing function of (NCI/GDP), ceteris paribus. 
Substituting equations (2) and (3) into equation (1) and then proceeding to solve for EAR30 (after 
including an interaction term for DEF/GDP and TAXGAP/GDP, namely, INTER) yields the model initially 
underlying this study:    
 
EAR30 = f (DEF/GDP, MB/GDP, NCI/GDP, EAR3YR, EARTF, Y, TAXGAP/GDP, INTER),     
fDEF/GDP >0, fMB/GDP <0, fNCI/GDP <0, fEAR3YR >0, fEARTF >0,  fY  >0, fTAXGAP/GDP >0                           (4) 
 
The first of these hypothesized signs involves the federal budget deficit, expressed in this study as a 
percentage of GDP. The hypothesized sign on fDEF/GDP is positive, which reflects the “conventional 
wisdom” that when the Treasury attempts to finance a budget deficit (whether through the sale of bills, 
notes, bonds, or other debt instruments), it forces market interest rate yields upwards as it competes for 
funds in the financial markets (Carlson and Spencer, 1975; Madura, 2008, esp. pp. 34-35; Ball, 2012). The 
second and third signs for the variables shown in equation (4) reflect the conventional wisdom regarding 
the impact of a greater availability of loanable funds, as reflected in either a relatively larger monetary 
base or greater international capital inflows, respectively, each of which enables the financial markets to 
absorb more government sector (as well as private sector) debt and thereby acts to diminish upward 
pressure on interest rates (Madura, 2008, pp. 34-36). The next three hypothesized signs for the 
explanatory variables expressed in equation (4) are predicated directly upon equations (2) and (3) and 
the discussions thereof provided above. Finally, given the presence of income tax evasion and budget 
deficits in the model, an interaction term (INTER) for these two variables was initially included in the 
system, as follows:  
    
INTER = DEF/GDP*TAXGAP/GDP                  (5)      
 
However, the coefficient on the interaction term was statistically insignificant across all estimations; 
hence, it was omitted from the final estimations (Hair, et al, 2006; Wooldridge, 2009).  
 
THE INITIAL EMPIRICAL MODEL    
 
Based on (4), the initial model to be estimated in this study is provided by: 
 
EAR30t = α0 + α1 (DEF/GDP)t + α2 (MB/GDP)t + α3 (NCI/GDP)t + α4 EAR3YRt +  α5 EARTFt +  
α6 Yt + α7 (TAXGAP/GDP)t + α8  AR(1)  + Ɛt                                                                                                (6) 
 
where:  
EAR30t  = the ex ante real average interest rate yield on 30-year Treasury bonds in year t, expressed as a 
percent per annum;  
α0 = constant term; 
(DEF/GDP)t = the ratio of the unified /total nominal federal budget deficit to the nominal GDP in year t, 
expressed as a percent;  
(MB/GDP)t = the ratio of the nominal monetary base to the nominal GDP in year t, expressed as a percent; 
(NCI/GDP)t = the ratio of the nominal value of net international financial capital inflows to the nominal 
GDP level in year t, expressed as a percent; 





EAR3YRt = the ex ante real average interest rate yield on three-year Treasury notes  in year t, expressed 
as a percent per annum; 
EARTFt = the ex ante real average interest rate yield on high grade tax-exempt municipal bonds in year t, 
expressed as a percent per annum; 
Yt = percentage growth rate of real GDP during year t; 
(TAXGAP/GDP)t = the relative tax gap in year t, expressed as a percentage;  
AR(1) = the autoregressive term; and 
Ɛt = stochastic error term.  
The expected signs on the coefficients in equation (6) are summarized, as follows: 
 
α1 > 0, α2 < 0, α3 < 0, α4 > 0, α5 > 0, α6 > 0, α7 > 0                (7) 
 
Naturally, it is the result for coefficient α7 that is of greatest interest to this study (along with, albeit to a 
much lesser degree, given the objective of this study, the result for coefficient α1). The data for 
computing the tax evasion variable are available in the form of annual data through 2016. Full definitions 
of each of the variables considered in this study, along with their respective data sources, are provided 
in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Definitions and Data Sources for Variables 
Dependent Variable Definition and Data Source 
EAR30t 
the ex ante real average interest rate yield on 30-year Treasury bonds in year t, 
expressed as a percent per annum; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2017) and 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (2019) 
Explanatory Variables from equation (6) 
(DEF/GDP)t 
the ratio of the unified /total nominal federal budget deficit to the nominal GDP 
in year t, expressed as a percent; Council of Economic Advisors (2002, 2004, 2010, 
2013, 2018) 
(MB/GDP)t   
the ratio of the nominal monetary base to the nominal GDP in year t, expressed 
as a percent; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2017) 
(NCI/GDP)t   
the ratio of the nominal value of net international financial capital inflows to the 
nominal GDP level in year t, expressed as a percent; Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis (2017) 
EAR3YRt 
the ex ante real average interest rate yield on three-year U.S Treasury notes in 
year t, expressed as a percent per annum; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
(2017) and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (2019) 
EAR10YRt 
the ex ante real average interest rate yield on ten-year U.S. Treasury notes in year 
t, expressed as a percent per annum; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2017) and 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (2019) 
EARTFt 
the ex ante real average interest rate yield on high grade tax-exempt municipal 
bonds in year t, expressed as a percent per annum; Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis (2017) and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (2019) 
Yt 
percentage growth rate of real GDP during year t; Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis (2017) 
(TAXGAP/GDP)t    
the nominal tax gap in year t, expressed as a percent of nominal GDP in the same 
year; Ledbetter (2004, 2007), Foertsch (2016), and the Council of Economic 
Advisors (2004, 2018) 






the ratio of the nominal federal primary budget deficit to the nominal GDP in 
year t, expressed as a percent; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2017) 
EARBAAt 
the ex ante real interest rate yield on Moody’s Baa-rated interest rate yield in 
year t, expressed as a percent per annum; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
(2017) and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (2019) 
 
Descriptive statistics for the all of the variables in equation (6) as well as for those in equations (8), (10), 
and (11) for the 1982-2016 study period, are provided in Table 4.   
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics, 1982-2016 











DEF/GDP 3.203 2.649 9.80 -2.30 
MB/GDP 85.39 55.05 225.7 47.6 
NCI/GDP 2.62 1.58 5.73 -0.049 
EAR3YR 2.116 2.37 7.17 -1.22 
EARTF 2.836 1.142 5.81 1.14 
Y 2.686 1.899 7.3 -2.8 
TAXGAP/GDP 1.103 0.136 1.325 0.765 












The dependent variable, EAR30t, is contemporaneous with all seven of the explanatory variables in 
the model. Accordingly, in order to address potential endogeneity problems, the model is estimated by 
auto-regressive two stage least squares (AR/2SLS). The instruments are the two-year lags of each of the 
explanatory variables (Hair, et al, 2006; Greene, 2008; Wooldridge, 2009); interestingly, the adoption of 
“more distant” lags, such as three-year lags, on the instruments yields nearly the very similar results and 
the very same conclusions (see, e.g., Hair, et al. 2006; Wooldridge, 2009, Chapter 15). 
 
RESULTS OF THE INITIAL AR/2SLS ESTIMATION     
 
Using the model provided in equation (6), the estimation technique adopted in this study involves in part 
the AR(1) autoregressive process. This procedure is of interest and relevance and has numerous times-
series applications, with the autoregressive process being arguably best applicable to time-series data 
that exhibit more volatile behavior. Examples of the latter would include stock market (equity) indices, 
individual stock (equity) prices, and, as is the focus in this study, interest rate yields (Hair, et al., 2006; 
Wooldridge, 2009). Furthermore, the 2SLS estimation is adopted in order to address the potential 
simultaneity/endogeneity issues referred to above. 
The AR/2SLS estimation of equation (6) is provided in Table 5, where coefficients, standard errors, t-
values, and prob. values can be found, along with other pertinent estimation information, including the 
J-statistic. Based on the Breusch and Pagan (1979) test, a heteroscedasticity correction was necessary; 
accordingly, the reported results reflect the application of the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity 
correction. As shown in Table 5, all seven of the estimated coefficients exhibit the hypothesized signs. 
Five of these estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level, and two are significant at 
the 2.5% level. In addition, the J-statistic, which is significant at nearly the 5% level, favorably attests to 
the exogeneity of the instrumental variables. Furthermore, the inverted root is -0.21, a value that implies 
the estimation involves a stationary autoregressive process.
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6 The latter finding, like that shown in Table 5, is consistent at least in principle with several prior studies of interest rate yields 
(of varying maturities) and federal budget deficits for earlier time periods (e.g., Hoelscher, 1986; Swamy, Kolluri, and 




Table 5. Initial AR/2SLS Estimation Results, Unified Deficit 
Dependent Variable: EAR30 











DEF/GDP 0.167*** 0.0322 5.20 0.0000 
MB/GDP -0.007*** 0.0019 -3.41 0.0021 
NCI/GDP -0.1001** 0.0367 -2.72 0.0114 
EARTF 0.0489*** 0.1732 2.83 0.0089 
EAR3YR 0.306*** 0.1036 2.95 0.0066 
Y 0.134*** 0.0269 4.97 0.0000 
Constant -0.574 0.7004 -0.82 0.4200 
AR(1) -0.212    





  0.0780 
 
***statistically significant at the 1% level; **statistically significant at the 2.5% level; #statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Regarding the control variables, the estimation results imply that the ex ante real interest rate yield 
on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds has been an increasing function of both the ex ante real interest rate 
yields on three-year Treasury notes  (EAR3YR) and high grade municipal bonds (EARTF). The real interest 
rate yield on 30-year Treasuries is also shown to have been an increasing function of the percentage 
growth rate of real GDP, Y, while being a decreasing function of the monetary base variable, MB/GDP, 
and the net international capital inflows variable, NCI/GDP.  All of these results are consistent with the 
signs hypothesized in Sections 2 and 3.    
Attention is now directed at the explanatory variables of principal interest in this study, first and 
foremost being the tax evasion variable (TAXGAP/GDP)t and, to a lesser degree, being the budget deficit 
variable, (DEF/GDP)t, which can reasonably be regarded as a de facto control variable. Regarding these 
two variables, the ex ante real interest rate yield on 30-year Treasury bonds is found to be an increasing 
function (at the 2% level) of the relative tax gap variable, (TAXGAP/GDP)t, whereas it is also found to be 
an increasing function (at the 1% level) of the unified/total federal budget deficit variable, (DEF/GDP)t.6 
Although the latter finding is of interest, of greatest interest and relevance to this study is the heretofore 
unexplored outcome implying that the greater the degree of aggregate federal personal income tax 
evasion, as measured here by the relative tax gap, the higher the ex ante real market interest rate yield 
on 30-year Treasury bonds. This finding vis-à-vis variable (TAXGAP/GDP)t in particular would seem to raise 
the very real possibility that personal income tax evasion per se may well contribute to the degree of 
crowding out, an issue heretofore associated typically only with government budget deficits per se 
(Carlson and Spencer, 1975; Cecchetti, 2006, p. 562; Madura, 2008, pp. 34, 106; Cebula, 2018).   
 
AN ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION: THE PRIMARY BUDGET DEFICIT  
 
In order to provide further potential insight into the impact of income tax evasion on the long-term real 
Treasury bond yield, we next estimate an alternative specification of the model shown in equation (6) 
and described in (7). Specifically, the new specification [(8) and (9) below] differs from the original model 
considered above insofar as it includes, in place of the unified/total deficit, the primary federal budget 
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suggested in Wooldridge, 2009, Chapter 15, p. 23) in the potential presence of auto-correlated errors, yielded the same 




deficit, (PRIMARYDEF/GDP)t, which is the unified/total budget deficit minus net interest payments by the 
Treasury. Accordingly, the new model to be estimated, which excludes the interaction term between the 
primary budget deficit and the relative tax gap, which was found once again to be statistically 
insignificant (Wooldridge, 2009), is provided in equation (8):7 
 
EAR30t = b0 + b1 (PRIMARYDEF/GDP)t + b2 (MB/GDP)t + b3 (NCI/GDP)t + b4 EAR3YRt +  
b5  EARTFt  + b6 Yt  + b7 (TAXGAP/GDP)t  + b8 AR(1)  + Ɛt ‘                                             (8) 
 
The hypothesized signs on the coefficients in equation (8) are, as follows: 
 
b1 > 0, b2 < 0, b3 < 0, b4 > 0, b5 > 0, b6 > 0, b7 > 0               (9) 
 
Once again, it is the finding for coefficient b7 that is of greatest interest to this study.  
The AR/2SLS estimation of equation (8) is provided in Table 6. As shown, all of the estimated 
coefficients exhibit the hypothesized signs, with five being significant at the 1% level, one being 
significant at the 2.5% level, and one being significant at the 5% level. The J-statistic, which is significant at 
beyond the 5% level, attests very favorably to the exogeneity of the instruments. The AR root is -0.17, 
which implies the estimation involves a stationary autoregressive process. The estimation results imply, 
among other things, that EAR30t is an increasing function of EAR3YRt, EARTFt, and Yt, while being a 
decreasing function of both (MB/GDP)t and (NCI/GDP)t. In addition,  EAR30t is found to be an increasing 
function of the primary federal budget deficit-to-GDP variable. 
 
Table 6. Alternative AR/2SLS Estimation Results, Primary Deficit 
Dependent Variable: EAR30 











DEF/GDP 0.128*** 0.0259 4.95 0.0000 
MB/GDP -0.006*** 0.0018 -3.41 0.0042 
NCI/GDP -0.1189** 0.0447 -2.66 0.0132 
EARTF 0.592*** 0.1434 4.13 0.0003 
EAR3YR 0.292*** 0.0900 3.24 0.0032 
Y 0.152*** 0.0323 4.70 0.0001 
Constant -0.028 0.4860 -0.06 0.9551 
AR(1) -0.134    





  0.0476 
 
***statistically significant at the 1% level; **statistically significant at the 2.5% level; # statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Furthermore, and most relevant to the objective of this study, there is the empirical finding 
summarized in Table 6 that the greater the relative tax gap, the higher the real interest rate yield on 30-
year Treasury bonds.8 This estimation result, like that in Table 5, would seem to imply the existence of an 
income-tax-evasion induced crowding out. Once again, it is observed that this interest rate impact 
attributable expressly to the relative tax gap measure of personal income tax evasion is unique among 
studies of U.S. Treasury yields and studies of U.S. income tax evasion.





FURTHER INQUIRY: MOODY’S BAA-RATED CORPORATE BOND YIELDS  
 
Tables 5 and 6 provide empirical evidence supportive of the relative tax gap hypothesis in terms of the 
ex ante real interest rate yield on long-term, i.e., 30 year Treasury bonds. In this section, we inquire 
whether there is evidence that the relative tax gap also exerts upward pressure on the yield for long-
term corporate bond issues. More specifically, the empirical investigation summarized in this section 
of the study addresses whether the hypothesis in question applies to say, the ex ante real interest rate 
yield on Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bonds, EARBAA. Paralleling the analysis underlying Tables 5 and 
6, it is hypothesized that the upward pressure from the relative tax gap on the ex ante real interest 
rate yield on 30-year Treasury bonds will also, through competition in the financial markets (Carlson and 
Spencer, 1975; Cebula, 1994; Haubrich, Pennacchi, and Ritchken, 2012), exert upward pressure on 
private sector longer-term corporate yields, such as the EARBAA. 
Accordingly, we investigate this hypothesis by estimating the following two equations by AR/2SLS: 
 
EARBAAt = c0 + c1 (DEF/GDP)t + c2 (MB/GDP)t + c3 (NCI/GDP)t + c4 EAR3YRt +  c5 EARTFt      
 + c6 Yt + c7 (TAXGAP/GDP)t + c8  AR(1)  + Ɛt”              (10) 
 
EARBAAt = d0 + d1 (PRIMARYDEF/GDP)t + d2 (MB/GDP)t + d3 (NCI/GDP)t + d4 EAR3YRt  
+ d5 EARTFt  + d6 Yt  + d7 (TAXGAP/GDP)t  + d8 AR(1)  + Ɛt “’                    (11) 
 
The estimates of equations (10) and (11) are provided in Tables 7 and 8, respectively. As shown in Table 
7, the J-statistic is significant at the 5% level, implying exogeneity of the lagged instrumental variables 
(lag=3), and the autoregressive root (-.31) indicates a stable autoregressive process. In Table 7, it also is 
revealed that the relative tax gap is found to exercise a positive and statistically significant (at the 4% 
level) impact on the ex ante real interest rate yield on Moody’s Baa-rated long-term corporate bonds. 
This result is entirely compatible with its counterparts in Tables 5 and 6. Furthermore, as shown in Table 
8, where the primary budget deficit is considered in place of the unified deficit, there is further evidence 
that the relative tax gap exercises a statistically significant (at the 2% level) positive impact on the real 
Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bond yield.  
 
Table 7. New AR/2SLS Estimation Results, Unified Deficit 
Dependent Variable: EARBAA 











DEF/GDP 0.162# 0.0839 1.93 0.0642 
MB/GDP -0.006* 0.0026 -2.28 0.0309 
NCI/GDP -0.1283# 0.0752 -1.71 0.1000 
EARTF 0.763** 0.3021 2.53 0.0180 
EAR3YR 0.283 0.1755 1.61 0.1193 
Y -0.162 0.0607 -1.08 0.2891 
Constant 0.224 0.9936 0.22 0.8268 
AR(1) -0.314    





  0.0470 
 
***statistically significant at the 1% level; **statistically significant at the 2.5% level; *statistically significant at the 5% level; # 
statistically significant at the 10% level.  
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Table 8. New AR/2SLS Estimation Results, Primary Deficit 
Dependent Variable: EARBAA 











PRIMARYDEF/GDP 0.135# 0.0715 1.89 0.0697 
MB/GDP -0.006*** 0.0020 -2.94 0.0068 
NCI/GDP -0.1317 0.0811 -1.62 0.1166 
EARTF 1.016*** 0.3414 2.98 0.0062 
EAR3YR 0.211 0.1533 1.37 0.1808 
Y -0.059 0.0534 -1.12 0.2719 
Constant -0.543 0.8853 -0.61 0.5445 
AR(1) 0.066    





  0.0943 
 
***statistically significant at the 1% level; **statistically significant at the 2.5% level; *statistically significant at the 5% level; # 




The principal objective of this exploratory study is to empirically investigate the relative tax gap 
hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, the higher the relative tax gap, the higher the real interest rate yield 
on 30 year U.S. Treasury bonds. The potential impact of federal personal income tax evasion in the 
form of the relative tax gap per se on ex ante real Treasury debt (or, for that matter, on long-term 
corporate debt) interest rate yields has not heretofore been explored in either the income tax evasion 
literature or the interest rate literature.  
As shown in Tables 5 and 6, the AR/2SLS estimations find that higher values of the relative tax gap 
measure of income tax evasion elevate the ex ante real interest rate yield on 30-year Treasury bonds.9 
According to the conventional wisdom (Carlson and Spencer, 1975; Cebula, 1994; Haubrich, Pennacchi, 
and Ritchken, 2012), this upward pressure from the relative tax gap on the ex ante real interest rate 
yield on 30-year Treasury bonds would in theory also, through competition in the financial markets, 
exert upward pressure on longer-term corporate interest rates as well. It is not surprising then, as 
shown in Tables 7 and 8, that there is also empirical evidence that the larger the relative tax gap, the 
higher the ex ante real interest rate yield on Moody’s Baa-rated long-term corporate bonds. Separately 
as well as in combination, these findings raise the possibility that income tax evasion in the form of the 
relative tax gap may well contribute, by raising real interest rates, to the crowding out of private sector 
investment in new plant and equipment most commonly associated with federal government budget 
deficits per se (Carlson and Spencer, 1975; Cecchetti, 2006, p. 562; Madura, 2008, pp. 34, 106; Cebula, 
2018). Hence, the empirical results suggest the existence of a “tax-evasion-induced crowding out effect.” 
Accordingly, it would seem that policymakers and politicians could better serve the public good if 
they were more and better informed and, correspondingly, more efficiently proactive in taking steps to 
reduce federal personal income tax evasion in the U.S. To the extent that new or modified public policies 
are implemented and are successful in curbing the degree of personal income tax evasion, there 
arguably is reason to believe that the upward pressure on long-term ex ante real interest rates might 





very well be alleviated and, furthermore, that the growth rate of the national debt could be diminished. 
Needless to say, further empirical research regarding the issues considered in this study is necessary in 
order to establish confidence in the relative tax gap hypothesis. Indeed, more elaborate modeling and 
more sophisticated econometrics are two obvious paths for subsequent related future research; 
furthermore, a longer study period and a possible refocus on ex post real or nominal interest rates may 
yield interesting and useful results. 
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